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An Amateur’s Guide to Denial and 
Deception 
JAMES J. WIRTZ 
Barton Whaley: Practice to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners 
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2016, 280 p., $39.95. 
Until his death in 2013, Barton Whaley 
was the foremost Western expert on 
the art of denial and deception, an 
engaging iconoclast who understood 
the connection among magicians, 
card sharps, Operation FORTITUDE, 
and Greeks bearing gifts. When 
Whaley spoke, astute students would 
pay attention to every word. An 
attentive listener might be treated to a 
spontaneous explanation of deception 
theory, counter-deception theory, a 
compelling analysis of how denial and 
deception facilitated Nazi rearmament 
in the 1920s and ‘30s, or the unsettling 
observation that efforts at denial and 
deception work most of the time. 
Whaley spent his scholarly life 
cataloging instances of denial and 
deception in what appeared to be 
a quest to uncover every successful 
stratagem to forewarn future 
policymakers and officers. He could 
not succeed in that task, but he 
managed to collect a series of 
compelling insights into the human 
mind and how people, bureaucracies, 
and politics itself can be manipulated, 
especially by those who understand 
the intricacies of denial and deception. 
Decades of empirical work enabled 
him to speak with authority about the 
use of stratagem in all sorts of 
endeavors. 
James J. Wirtz is Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies and 
former Chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs at the United 
States Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. A former Chairman 
and Program Chairman of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International 
Studies Association (ISA), he has also been President of the International 
Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science 
Association. A graduate of the University of Delaware, with a Ph.D. from 
Columbia University, New York City, he is the author and co-author of several 
books on intelligence and arms control. In March 2016, he was named a 
Distinguished Senior Scholar by the ISA’s Intelligence Studies Section at its 
annual meeting in Atlanta, Georgia.  
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MAKING SCHEMES WORK 
Practice to Deceive, published 
posthumously, is a classic Whaley 
study. Edited by Susan Stratton 
Aykroyd, this unfinished catalog of 
case studies, vignettes, notes and 
analysis explores various aspects of 
eighty-eight instances of denial and 
deception. Whaley uses the cases to 
explore why some people are drawn 
to deception planning, what makes 
them successful, how plans are 
implemented by military staffs and 
bureaucracies, and how reluctant 
commanders are sold on the use of 
stratagem. In the course of this 
survey, he offers a checklist of first 
principles that can be used to devise 
a scheme to deceive and the key 
factors that must be manipulated for 
a stratagem to have a strategic or 
operational impact in war. Practice 
to Deceive might best be thought of 
as an amateur’s annotated guide to 
denial and deception. 
Theoretically, Whaley is most 
interested in the psychology of 
denial and deception, meaning the 
psychology of the deceived and 
the deceiver. Successful deception 
planners share several common traits. 
They are intelligent and have a good 
sense of humor, while paradoxically 
remaining reserved in most social 
situations. Whaley notes that military 
deception often contains an element 
of humor; it can be thought of as a 
practical joke played on opponents to 
get them to act according to one’s 
wishes. For instance, R.V. Jones, a 
keen student and practitioner of 
deception, once bet a colleague that 
he could get a person to place his 
phone in a bucket of water. After 
repeatedly calling an Oxford professor 
on the phone in a way that simulated 
a problem that seemed to be partially 
resolved by minor movements of the 
device, he managed to get the gullible 
man to submerge the phone. Jones 
realized that the prank worked 
because the victim had come to rely 
on a single source (the voice at the 
other end of the line) for information 
about his situation. This fact was 
the key to manipulating the victim’s 
behavior. Years later, when the 
Germans became alarmed about their 
U-boat losses in World War II, Jones 
convinced them that the British 
possessed an infrared device that 
made submarines easy to spot on the 
surface. The Germans painted their 
U-boats with a new type of paint that 
effectively cloaked their submarines’ 
infrared signatures, never realizing 
that the British were employing a 
new type of radar to spot the U- 
boats. “Practical jokes and hoaxes 
work for the same reasons that 
military deception plans work,” notes 
Whaley. “Both involve ‘induced 
incongruities’ where by presenting 
false evidence the deceiver lets the 
victim ‘build up an incorrect but self 
consistent world picture’, thus 
causing him to take actions that are 
incongruent with reality.” Victims of 
deception thus share a common trait: 
they fall victim to the desire for a 
sense of certainty about an unfolding 
situation. 
Whaley also addresses practical 
matters. He notes that experienced 
operations officers are most likely 
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to possess the necessary knowledge 
needed to not only manipulate the 
opponent, but to also manipulate 
their own organizations to get them 
to accept and implement deception 
schemes that can sometimes appear 
far-fetched ex ante. “The deception 
planners must not only know 
their Commander’s goal for each 
operation,” according to Whaley, 
“but they must be prepared to ‘sell’ 
their plan to that Commander or 
joint staff.” He observes that good 
deception planners do more than 
think “outside the box.” They often 
ignore rules, regulations and standard 
operating procedures in their daily 
lives and are especially adept at 
ignoring all sorts of conventions and 
moral boundaries when it comes to 
devising ways to induce desired 
behavior in opponents. Whaley also 
identifies the foremost mistake made 
by deception planners: taking actions 
that alter an opponent’s perceptions, 
not actions. In other words, deception 
planners need to act on command 
guidance about how the opponent 
should act in the future and not focus 
on changing how the opponent 
perceives the unfolding situation. 
ASKING FUNDAMENTAL 
QUESTIONS 
When Whaley turns to the broadest 
strategic issues, however, his observations 
compel a contemplation of the 
implications of his judgments. For 
example, he notes that “the levels of 
guilefulness at any given point in 
time between any two contemporary 
armed entities (nations, insurgents, or 
terrorists) are apt to be asymmetric.” 
Some might dismiss this judgment as 
a restatement of the obvious; after 
all, opponents rarely possess equal 
qualities and capabilities. Yet, this 
straightforward observation identifies 
a fundamental question that should 
be addressed by intelligence analysts 
when contemplating the behavior of 
a potential opponent: what is the 
opponent’s relative propensity to 
engage in denial and deception? While 
such a question can never be 
answered with certainty, a guess might 
be ventured that, although accurate 
estimates are possible, they are rarely 
undertaken or acknowledged in a 
bureaucratic setting. 
Whaley also notes that “when all 
other factors are equal, the more 
deceptive player or team will always 
win.” This observation flies in the 
face of Carl von Clausewitz’s lack of 
enthusiasm for stratagem—leading to 
perhaps pondering if the Prussian 
philosopher’s experience during the 
Napoleonic wars was a bit too limited 
to generate a definitive judgment about 
the utility of denial and deception on 
the modern battlefield. Nevertheless, 
such a sweeping generalization also 
suggests that guile is a quality that 
should be recognized as a key force 
multiplier, regardless of the advantages 




Whaley also hints at why bureaucracies 
are often resistant to undertaking 
denial and deception. The technique is 
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often practiced by oddballs and 
miscreants who just happen to be 
smarter than their fellow officers and 
other officials. They can often 
recognize and exploit incongruities in 
both their own and opposing 
organizations. These keen students of 
human nature understand that people 
tend to wear their emotions, innermost 
thoughts, and ambitions on their 
sleeves, and that bureaucracy is 
predictable and easily manipulated. 
They understand what motivates 
people in social and bureaucratic 
settings. Especially striking in the 
stories related by Whaley is the 
certainty expressed by deception 
planners that their schemes would 
work, and their occasional frustration 
that their opponents actually lacked 
the situational awareness (intelligence?) 
to be deceived. The best practitioners 
of stratagem not only recognize 
that the emperor has no clothes, 
but as R.V. Jones demonstrated, they 
can be made to dance naked to the 
tune of their manipulators’ choosing. 
Such people make uneasy those 
average commanders, run-of-the-mill 
bureaucrats, and others who, above 
all, love order. To the staid 
bureaucratic mind, the admonishment 
that stratagem can yield significant 
dividends seems to contain the seeds 
of subversion, a thought that can 
undermine good order and discipline. 
After all, those adept at duping the 
opponent might just turn their talents 
on those closer to home. 
Practice to Deceive not only 
explains the general principles behind 
the magic of deception, it literally 
offers a “by the numbers” guide to 
employing stratagem in war. That 
Barton Whaley was not merely a 
historian or theoretician, but in 
private life a practicing magician, is 
thus no coincidence. 
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